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Abstract
Many authors (e.g., Chomsky 1995, Pinker 1984, and Marcus 1998) argue that the architecture of
the language faculty contains two separate components: a (structured) lexicon and a computational
component. Clahsen presents in a current BBS target article (in press) new empirical evidences in
favour of such a dual-mechanism model of language processing based on a multidisciplinary study of
German inflection. In the following review, I will summarise and discuss the major points of Clahsen's
paper. My focus will be on theoretical, methodological and empirical issues presented and discussed in
the paper. An important issue will be the bearing of his empirical findings on the current debate in
psycholinguistic modelling. I will as well speculate that at least a part of Clahsen's reasoning seems not
to hold in the case of a language closely related to German, namely Luxembourgian.
Preliminary comments
Before reviewing Clahsen's paper, I would like to stress out its general logic. Linguistic descriptions
suggest a two components structure of the language faculty (namely, a lexicon and rule-based
operations). Empirical evidence from various dissociation studies must be sought to confirm their
psycho- and neurolinguistic relevance (cf. the correspondence hypothesis proposed by Miller &
Chomsky 1963). And, deficiencies of current (and probably future) single-mechanism models are taken
as supportive prove (at least temporarily) in favour of dual-mechanism models.
It is thus assumed, in terms of methodological claims, that dissociations of performances and brain
processes directly reflect dissociations of cognitive processes (a claim that will be discussed later). In
terms of psycholinguistic modelling, it follows from this reasoning that any valid model in
computational linguistics must (somehow) account for the dissociations found in linguistic descriptions
and in empirical data (I will return to this claim later on, too). Another major point of Clahsen's claims
is that German inflectional systems (for instance, plural noun formation and verb participle formation)
are particularly interesting to study for reasons exposed below.
2Summary
In a current BBS target article Harald Clahsen, Professor of Linguistics at the University of Essex,
presents a wide range of new empirical data collected by himself and his colleagues that aim to 'bear on
the controversy between dual and single-mechanism models of language'1. They studied German
inflection from different disciplines investigating its linguistic structure, how it is produced and
comprehended in real time, how it is processed in the brain, how it is affected by language disorders,
and, finally, how it develops in child language acquisition. Clahsen presents the results from these
studies as impressive converging evidence in favour of a dual-mechanism model of language
processing2.
In the context of inflection3, this model can be characterised as follows. It postulates 'two
qualitatively different clusters of inflectional phenomena, [namely] lexically-based inflection versus
inflection based on combinatorial rules'. This distinction corresponds to what other authors (Pinker
& Prince 1991) called the distinction between irregular and regular (default) inflection. Clahsen adopts
a model, the Minimalist Morphology introduced by Wunderlich & Fabri (1995) for English inflections,
that explicitly makes this distinction.
Lexically-based inflection is assumed to be accounted for by a structured lexicon. Each node in a
structured lexical entry corresponds to a pair of its 'category membership' (e.g. N(oun), V(erb)) and of
'idiosyncratic information' about its forms and meaning; and 'each subnode inherits all information of
its mother, except for the features it replaces or adds'. Subregularities among irregular forms are
'captured through lexical templates in which stem segments are associated with segments from
subnodes'.
On the other hand, processes of affixation (stem+affix) explain inflection based on combinatorial
rules. They can easily extend to novel items (this is why it is also called default inflection). Based on
this dual-mechanism model, Clahsen predicts, in general, that regular and irregular forms should, in
terms of processing, exhibit different effects. Indeed, regulars should reflect that they are 'computed via
their constituent morphemes', and irregular forms should 'exhibit associative memory effects'. This
general prediction will be adapted to different experimental paradigms and thus yields more precise
predictions that will be separately exposed below.
In order to support the hypothesis of the dual-mechanism model of the language faculty, Clahsen
first of all reviews some familiar arguments from linguistics, psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, neuro-
imaging and developmental studies in its favour. I will not elaborate on these arguments but rather on
the new evidences presented in the target article. Clahsen also reviews some recent attacks of the dual-
mechanism model by researcher from the field of connectionism (e.g., Elman et al. 1996, Rumelhart &
McClelland 1986, Seidenberg 1993). Associative single-mechanism models are designed to 'make
without the machinery of internally-represented, symbol-manipulating combinatorial operations'. The
claim of connectionism is that of parsimony and of neural-based implementation of cognitive
processes. But Clahsen thinks that there is still vast evidence for their 'severe deficiencies', for instance,
their failure to correctly master syntax, as shown by Fodor et al. (1974) and their failure to handle
inflectional systems, as remarked by Pinker & Prince (1988), Marcus et al. (1995), and Marcus (1998).
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 Although Clahsen presents the general idea of a dual-mechanism model three times in his paper (in the introduction and
later on in sections 3 & 4.1), I will describe it only once in order to avoid overloading the present review.
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 As said above, I will not extend on Clahsen's general description of the dual-mechanism model for language as such, but
merely concentrate on the particular model of inflectional system.
3According to Clahsen the main point of interest in this current connectionist-symbolist debate is to turn
to empirical evidences that might bear on the controversy.
Before presenting the studies on German inflections he and his colleagues performed, he argues for
their relevance by situating them in the general context of studies on inflectional systems, namely
studies on English past-tense formation, as well as in the context of the acknowledged need for cross-
language confirmation studies. He reports on studies that have shown double dissociations between
regular and irregular past tense forms in English using the paradigm of cross-modal priming. Studies on
developmental disorders, as well, showed similar dissociations for English speaking children (children
with William Syndrome are contrasted with those with Selective Language Impairment). Moreover,
some of these results seem to replicate in German-speaking aphasics.
Clahsen also points out that several attempts to simulate the properties of English past-tense
formation (in adults and in children) with the help of connectionist models remain flawed in some
important ways. He especially stresses the false assumptions about the nature of linguistic input and
about correlations between vocabulary development and overgeneralization errors, as well as the
unconstrained ability of neural networks to learn any arbitrary input-output mapping - 'even
linguistically impossible ones'.
On the other hand, Clahsen argues that English past-tense formation itself presents certain problems
that render it an unfavourable object of studies aiming to distinguish between single-mechanism and
dual-mechanism models. English is a basically inflectionally poor language and there is a certain
confusion of regularity (of inflections) with both the presence of an affix and with its frequency -
regular forms are more frequent than irregular forms and only regular forms take affixes.
German inflectional systems are better suited to Clahsen's project for two reasons: they are
inflectionally richer and they do not confound frequency of regular forms with the presence of an affix.
Indeed, German noun plurals and verb participles can take several endings (two for verbs and four for
nouns), where one of them can be considered to be regular and the other(s) to be irregular. Moreover,
regular forms are far from being the most frequent forms. Processing of regular forms can thus,
according to Clahsen, not be explained by mere associative learning mechanisms, since here it cannot
be that the more a network encounters such a form, the more it tends to generalise it to new (or
nonsense) words. Therefore the author proposes a dual-mechanism approach to German inflection. The
general features of this model have been presented above. Since Clahsen and colleagues have chosen to
examine the 'phenomenon of grammatical inflection [É] focusing on noun plurals and participle
formation [É] a linguistic analysis of this inflectional system [is] presented which makes use of two
kinds of linguistic representations, affixation and structured lexical entries'.
German participle formation involves two endings, the irregular one being -n, and the regular one
being -t. As already mentioned above, the regular (or default) 'suffix applies to words for which lexical
entries are not readily available' (e.g., nonsense words).4 This is not the case for the irregular suffix,
which furthermore, by contrast to the regular suffix, 'co-occurs with phonologically unpredictable stem
changes'.5 As stated before, this regular/irregular distinction is supposed to be linked to a distinction of
cognitive processes. German noun plurals are constructed using five endings (-n, -s, -er, and -0) along
with possible vowel changes. None of these suffixes is 'statistically predominant, and the use of these
endings with specific nouns is not readily captured by standard inflectional rules'. But the German
plural system provides a default process which 'applies when irregular forms are not accessible'.5
Affixation of -s applies 'when the phonological environment does not permit any other plural
allomorph'. It also readily generalises to a range of derived nouns (e.g., rootless or headless nouns,
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 In order to simplify reading I will speak of regular vs. irregular suffixes in the rest of this review.
4eponyms, product names, nominalised VP) and nonsense words. Again, the description of regular vs.
irregular plurals is supposed to be paralleled by a difference in morphological processing.
 In the following, I will report on the various empirical results found in different studies based on the
linguistic considerations and the Minimal Morphology model presented above. These studies involved
as well psycholinguistic laboratory experiments, as neuro-imaging studies and developmental studies.
The general structure of argumentation has been presented above and remains essentially the same
throughout all these studies. Consequently, I will briefly describe the paradigms used and the results
obtained, for each study.
In adults, Clahsen and colleagues examined three different major effects on regular vs. irregular
inflections, namely those found in generalisation of inflectional processes, visual lexical decision, and
cross-modal morphological priming.
Effects of generalising inflectional processes were examined with three tasks comprising
generalisation to nonsense words, matching sentences containing nonsense participles and judging for
acceptability participle and plural forms of unusual words. Generalisation to nonsense words involved
(1) that subjects filled-in in sentences with participles of nonsense verbs provided their infinitive and
past tense forms (the past tense forms indicated whether nonsense verbs followed regular or irregular
inflection patterns); and (2) that they judged the acceptability of regularly vs. irregularly derived plurals
of nonsense nouns that were either rhymes or non-rhymes of existing German nouns. For the participle
condition (1), it was predicted that subjects would preferentially produce regular participles, except
when the nonsense verbs were similar to existing irregular ones, corresponding to inflection by
analogy. This pattern of results was indeed observed. For the plurals condition (2), predicted results
(namely that irregular plurals should be 'judged better for nouns that rhymed with existing [irregular]
nouns than for non-rhymes', whereas regular plurals should be 'judged worse in the rhyme condition
than in the non-rhyme condition') were found too.
In the visual lexical decision study, effects of word-form frequency were investigated. Indeed, it
follows from the dual-mechanism model that irregularly inflected forms are more likely to produce
word-form frequency effects than regularly inflected ones, since the latter are supposed not to be
represented in the lexicon as such. On the contrary, they are derived from default affixation processes
applied to existing word-stems. Irregularly inflected forms, themselves, are supposed to be stored in
memory and can thus present frequency effects in lexical decision tasks. The predicted asymmetry in
frequency effects was produced with German participles: reaction times for irregular participles, but
not for regular participles, are affected by their word-form frequencies, suggesting that only irregularly
inflected participles have lexical entries (whose differential frequencies can act on reaction times).
In the cross-modal morphological priming study three different conditions, involving auditory
primes and visual targets, were created: identical primes and targets, morphologically related primes
and targets (e.g. walked - walk, respectively taught - teach6), and unrelated primes and targets. Note
that priming effects are generally assumed to result from activation of lexical representations. In this
study, priming effects were predicted to be different for regularly inflected words than for irregularly
inflected words. For regular participles and nouns, full priming was expected, i.e. same facilitation (on
target decisions) by morphological primes as by identical primes, but no facilitation by unrelated
primes. For irregular participles and nouns, on the other hand, partial priming should occur, i.e., only
identical primes should produce facilitation, but not morphologically related primes. The reasoning of
these predictions goes as follows: regular forms are decomposed into stem+affix, which both have
lexical entries of their own, hence the repetition of the same stem (which occurs both with identical
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5primes and with morphologically related primes) produces facilitation on the target decision. Irregular
forms, however, are represented on subnodes of lexical representations. Consequently, they activate
their corresponding entries only indirectly, via subnodes. They should thus produce less facilitation
than identical primes. The expected results were produced for both plural nouns than for participles.
Note that, with plurals, irregular forms produced overall shorter reaction times than regular forms
related to the frequency differences between these two classes of nouns.
 These converging results, suggesting that different cognitive mechanisms are involved in
processing of regular and irregular inflections are supported by data obtained in neuro-imaging studies
on German inflection. Clahsen and colleagues, for reasons of temporal resolution, 'applied the ERP7
method to examine the brain structures involved in morphological processing and representation'.
Previous studies with this method showed that the most promising paradigm for research on language
involves violations of linguistic regularities. In the context of research on inflection this implies that
violations of regular affixation elicit similar ERP effects than other morpho-syntactic violations in
specific brain structures (P600 and LAN8). Two studies have been conducted using the ERP method:
one on noun plurals and one on participle formation. For each of these studies four groups of stimuli
were created by the intersection of two variables: regular vs. irregular and misapplication vs. correct
application. There were thus two types of stimuli that potentially corresponded to morpho-syntactic
violations: those resulting from irregularisation and those from regularisation. The prediction was,
however, that only misapplication of regular inflections would indeed elicit the typical ERP effects
signalising real morpho-syntactic violations. It would surely surpass the scope of this review to
describe the results in details that are reported for the two ERP-studies. Let me just briefly cite Clahsen
when he says that 'in sum, [for plural nouns and participles] regularizations were associated with a
negative waveform with a focal left anterior temporal distribution [the LAN effect], that occurs when
affixation is incorrectly applied. [É] Irregularizations [on the other side] do not involve violations of
affixation, but may rather be conceived of as unexpected or anomalous words. The ERP-results support
this interpretation [since] the central negativity found for [É] irregularizations does [É] resemble [an
ERP-effect] which occurs [with] pronounceable non-words'. Clahsen concludes that the neuro-imaging
results correspond to the linguistic distinction made between regular and irregular inflections.9
Based on all those converging results which suggest the psycho- and neurolinguistic relevance of the
dual-mechanism model, one question seems to inevitably pop up: how does this dual structure emerge
in child language acquisition? At present, there seem to be two ways to address this question, 'Neo-
Constructivism' and 'The Continuity Hypothesis'. Clahsen (rather rapidly) concludes with Marcus
(1998) that 'connectionism cannot save constructivism' (for reasons exposed above). Consistent with
the general framework within which Clahsen's thinking is to be placed, he strains the 'claims that the
structure of the language faculty does not change over time but that development results from other
factors [such as] increases in the child's lexicon'. The correct use of inflections emerges as soon as the
child 'picks up [the inflectional affixes] from the input, [É] which can then become effective, though
they were (latently) available [before]. For reasons of perceptual non-salience, lack of stress and
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6absence of isolated utterance, affixes are hard to grasp for children, and thus, they only gradually
become lexical entries in themselves.
Based on 'evidence for continuity and lexical learning' coming from studies on the acquisition of
syntax, Clahsen proposes to study the development of inflection from this point of view. Two main
observations have been made in child inflection acquisition that support the dual-mechanism model,
namely observations about overgeneralisations of inflections and those about constraints on word
formation processes related to inflections.
Concerning overgeneralisations, German verb participle formation and plural noun formation have
been studied in experiments designed to elicited speech production of children. For participle
formation, children's speech productions showed (1) a clear preference for default affixation-based
participles; and (2) a clear effect of token frequency among overregularisations; and (3) that by default,
children apply the regular suffix to verbs that have no lexical entries. For plural nouns, children, faced
with pictures denoting low-frequency nouns, tended to produce overregularised plural forms, which
they were even more likely to produce if the nouns were unfamiliar to them. This furthermore stressed
the 'default' nature of the regular affixation process. In order to control for similarity-based
generalisations Clahsen and his colleagues designed an acceptability judgement task, in which children
were to choose between regular and irregular plural forms when presented either with nonsense words
that were rhymes or non-rhymes of existing nouns. They found that children preferred regular form to
irregular forms only in the non-rhyme condition, whereas in the rhyme condition no difference in
preference existed. Overall, children even preferred regular forms to irregular ones in both rhyme and
non-rhyme conditions. These results taken together suggest that the dual structure of language is in
place early on and that it closely maps that of adults.
Concerning constraints on word formation processes, Clahsen and his colleagues investigated the
relationship between compounding and inflection. The predictions of their dual-mechanism model are
quite clear-cut. 'Lexical compounding is a process that concatenates lexical entries. It follows that
irregular plurals (because they have lexical entries) can be fed into the compounding process, whereas
affixation-based forms [É] (which do not have lexical entries) cannot be included in the compounding
process'. This results, probably, from a grammatical ordering constraint present in children to some
extent at least. What Clahsen predicts is a correlation between plurals-inside-compounds and
overregularisation. Indeed, 'plural forms that are used in overgeneralizations should be omitted from
the non-head elements of compounds. This would mean that even though the children's plural forms
might be incorrect in terms of adult grammar, the ordering constraint on plurals-inside-compounds
would be operative in the child's linguistic system'. According to a morphological theory children
should tend to omit regulars but maintain irregulars inside compounds. Two findings, based on the
analysis of spontaneous speech sample and on an elicited production task, strongly suggest that
German children never use regular plurals in compounds, and that they specifically restrict default
plural inflection from compounds significantly more than they restrict non-default inflection. The
observed interaction between compounding and inflection is said 'to follow from the internal
organization of children's language faculty' which is essentially the same as that of adults.
Let us finally turn to Clahsen's discussion of associative models of German inflection. He presents
three ways [sic] in which associative schemas could cope with German inflection. The first attempt
made by Nakisa et al. (1998) used a pattern associator network to implement the German plural
formation system. The performance of this simple associative has been compared with a simulation 'in
which the regular plural was removed from the pattern associator and was only applied to singular
items that were phonologically distant from other singular items in the sample (in order to implement a
dual-mechanism model). They found that the second model did not outperform the first and concluded
7that a single-mechanism model was sufficient to model German plural formation. However, Clahsen
does not agree with their reasoning for several reasons. Their model does not so well as they claim,
since it produced as much as 20-30% errors. The fact that their model had the regular plural hard-wired
to apply to phonologically distant nouns can barely be considered a satisfying solution, for this does not
correspond to a legal claim about German plurals. What is more, their model simply failed to generalise
the regular plural in cases where no lexical entries can be accessed (e.g., nonsense words). Clahsen
refutes their model as a descriptively inadequate 'model of linguistic and psycholinguistic properties of
German noun plurals'.
According to Clahsen, Westermann & Goebel's (1995) model seems to be more attractive. It
implements two separate components (a combinatorial system and an associative phonological
lexicon). He rather briefly states that this model correctly reproduced some results that he has reported
on. It seems that it somewhat correctly generalises to participles of novel items, as a function of
similarity.
He cites another model from the same research group (Goebel & Indefrey 1998) that was designed
to account for German plural formation. He also rapidly stresses the authors' concern about the
essential difficulties of their model to learn to apply, by default, the extremely rare regular affix.
Schema-based approaches to inflection are confronted with the same problem as associative
connectionist pattern associators, as long as they do not account for the linguistic and experimental
differences between regular and irregular inflection.
Most importantly, the 'default nature of regular affixes does not necessarily follow from their
frequency distribution'. This, according to Clahsen, 'makes it even hard to imagine how any
conventional single-mechanism pattern associator could ever get the facts of German inflection right'.
Discussion
Clahsen's paper is particularly interesting for several reasons. First of all, it presents empirical
evidences from various disciplines. This multidisciplinary nature of his study clearly reinforces the
strength of its claims. Second, it is about German. This is interesting in itself, since cross-language
confirmation studies are necessary to test for the genuinely general characteristics of human language.
What is more, Clahsen convincingly argues that German is better suited than English to test for the
dual-mechanism model. Third, the various empirical data converge. This is also, by itself, quite
impressive. Fourth, Clahsen's studies represent a more or less convincing attempt to defend the
"language-is-special-claim". The nature of language, the knowledge that underlies its use and its
acquisition are currently "hot issues". In no other domain of cognitive science, is the clash between the
"classicists" and the "connectionists" so tangible. The whole discussion is about whether cognition, and
especially language, can do without rules or not. Clahsen and his colleagues aimed to contribute to this
controversy by providing empirical evidences in favour of the claim that language cannot be explained
by simple associative learning mechanisms, but ÿhat combinatorial rules really are indispensable to
account for human cognition. At first sight, their converging results do seem to render the dual-
mechanism model of language quite plausible, regular inflection seems to imply rule-based
combinatorial operations. Clahsen even finds it rather difficult to imagine how simple associative
mechanisms could ever account for the empirical data found with German inflections. Yet, this is
precisely were Clahsen's argumentation is essentially flawed. Indeed linguistic analyses suggest a
distinction between a lexicon and combinatorial operations. Psycholinguistic experiments and
developmental studies suggest that this distinction has some functional reality: different cognitive
processes seem to underlie regular and irregular inflections. Different brain areas seem to be involved
in lexical and combinatorial processes too. All these data are clearly consistent with a dual-mechanism
8model of the language faculty. Yet, consistent with a dual-mechanism model does not necessarily mean
implying such a model.
The 'dissociation/transparency' fallacy
Indeed the methodological claim on with ClahsenÕs study is based, namely the (double) dissociation
method, has recently come under serious attack, which Clahsen altogether seem to ignore. David Plaut
(1995), for instance, has shown that double dissociations of performance do not necessarily imply
modularity. I other words, Ôthe functional specialization in the network that gives rise to the double
dissociation is not transparently related to the  networkÕs structure, as modular theories assumeÕ (Plaut
1995, emphasis added). This critique applies, a fortiori, to ClahsenÕs experimental data, since they do
not even show a double dissociation, but a simple dissociation of performances on regular and irregular
inflections in German. Yet, although these experimental data are not really conclusive, one could argue
in favour of ClahsenÕs study that it presents data, which indicate that the brain represents regular and
irregular inflections in a different way. Indeed, he showed that misapplications of regular inflections
yielded ERPs different to those yielded by misapplications of irregular inflections, and these potentials
were generated in different areas of the brain. Now this, would a proponent of the dual-mechanism
model say, really shows that affixation-based inflection is different from lexicon-based affixation. But I
will argue in the following that, even if these results could be described and explained in terms of
different cognitive processes, nothing implies that this implies, neither different processes (see above)
nor rule-based combinatorial operations.
The Ôdescription-equals-explanationÕ fallacy
Indeed, Clahsen seems to assume, because this seems more straightforward and parsimonious to
him, that there is a direct mapping between high-level descriptions and low-level mechanisms, which is
fundamental to the classical metaphor of the mind. Ô[S]tructural properties of inflected and (derived)
words should converge with their processing properties, a sensible prediction if our ultimate goal is an
integrated theory of brain and mental functions underlying language.Õ Still, models that are based on
this kind of claims fundamentally do not represent integrative theories of brain and mental functions
but reductionist theories. They assume that the neural level puts little constraints on the implementation
of cognitive processes, which can therefore be described in terms of classical symbol-processing
operations. These combinatorial rules are not taken to be convenient descriptions of linguistic entities
and cognitive processes, but they are assumed to provide us with explanatory models of psychological
mechanisms. Yet, it has also been shown that rule-like behaviour (or behaviour according to rules) does
not necessarily imply that this behaviour follows these rules. This reasoning is quite clear if we
consider the motion of planets. They do move in accord with KeplerÕs laws, but nobody would presume
that they actually, and explicitly apply KeplerÕs laws. In the same vein, I find it hard to imagine that
individual neurons (or even groups of neurons) apply some linguistic rules in order to directly produce
the dissociation between regular and irregular inflections. It may be convenient to describe a language
in terms of rules. But applying this description in a top-down fashion seems to inevitably lead to
untreatable paradoxes, since it would imply that their is no level of emergence where neural processes
take together produce rule-like behaviour. Instead, neurons would have to directly implement rules.
Compare this with recent findings in the domain of Artificial Life. Take, for instance, the swarm
behaviour of birds. A classicist would start describing the general rules that (seem) to govern this group
behaviour and would be inevitably lead to suppose that each and every individual of the group follows
these rules, granted that the correspondence hypothesis is straightforward and parsimonious.
Nevertheless, this is quite unnecessary and even wrong. Individuals do not know the rules that govern
coherent swarm behaviour and, moreover, it is absolutely not necessary to explain the emergent
9properties of swarm behaviour. Individual birds rather behave in accord with a set of rules implemented
in their neural system without having to follow these rules explicitly, in a traditional computer-like
fashion.
The Ôevidence-of-absenceÕ fallacy
Another weak point of ClahsenÕs general argumentative structure is that he takes the severe
deficiencies of current connectionist networks as clear evidence in favour of the correspondence
hypothesis. This reasoning is by no means valid. In fact, even if no current connectionist account for
the differential processing of regular and irregular inflections exists, this does not at all imply that the
dual-mechanism model represents more than a convenient description of the cognitive and brain
processes underlying language comprehension and production. Just as, absence of evidence does not
mean evidence of absence, failure of current models does not mean that this failure cannot be overcome
in the future. Ultimately, psycholinguistic modelling will have to account for the empirical data
presented by Clahsen, but in a way that is neurally plausible and that respects the low-level constraints
on the implementation of rule-like high-level processes.
The misunderstanding of connectionism
In sum, I seems to me, and this is confirmed by the fact that Clahsen keeps on referring to MarcusÕ
(1998) critics of connectionism, that he is prone to a fundamental misunderstanding of the
connectionist programme. Indeed, Marcus (1998) realised a neural network simulation with localist
input units and showed that the network could not generalise to new, untrained stimuli. Since very
young infants were able to generalise the underlying rule to new stimuli, Marcus concluded not only
that the network has severe deficiencies, but also that babies extract and apply abstract rules. Yet, his
simulation results are by no means surprising to the informed reader. Using localist input units alone
was sufficient to predict MarcusÕ simulation results. How could the network ever generalise to stimuli,
which are feed-in through untrained connections? However, no connectionist would claim that this is
possible. The proper way to simulate the empirical findings on supposed rule abstraction by babies is
rather to use parallel distributed processing, which allows the internal representations of the network to
capture the regularities inherent to the input and eventually behave in the desired rule-like fashion. I
conjecture that this fundamental misunderstanding of the connectionist framework stems not from the
authorsÕ ignorance but rather from the general theoretical framework which they embrace, namely the
classical metaphor of the mind, which understands the mind as a symbol-processing computer.
Connectionism truly represents a more interesting alternative to classicism than Clahsen wants the
reader to believe. It remains that the case of German default plural formation seems hard to be
accounted for by current connectionist models due to their low frequency as well in terms of type as
token. It may be speculated that since default affixation, in German, applies to low-frequency words, an
adequate neural network model could generalise in an affixation-like way to any other low-frequency
word, like nonsense words for instance.
Furthermore, the model he presents is far from being more precise than current neural network
models. Take, for instance, his description of how children are assumed to extract and use the affixes
for noun plurals and participles: ÔOnce separate lexical entries for [...] affixes have been created, the
affixation component can become effectiveÕ (my emphasis). I think this statement is symptomatic for
the whole theoretical programme that underlies ClahsenÕs study. Cognition equals symbol-processing
and new symbols are created (or give by the programmer). There is no room for auto-organisation of
internal representations. The increase in behavioural mastery of language does not yield from a better
representation of the multiple statistical constraints that exists in a language, but rather from an increase
of the lexicon (Ôgradual acquisition of new lexical and morphological itemsÕ).
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A lack of real implications
In sum, ClahsenÕs empirical evidences can hardly be said to have any real implications on the
current controversy between single and dual-mechanism models of the language faculty. For reasons of
scientific fairness I would like to stress out that current single-mechanism accounts of linguistic
performance are far from being satisfying. Even if they could entirely account for the observed
dissociations this would not necessarily imply that the functional or neural architecture could (pr
would) not contain separate processing mechanisms. In biological sciences, parsimony is not always an
ultimate principle, since natural selection rarely ÔcaresÕ about optimality. If we grant that the
mind/brainÕs functional architecture is a product of natural selection, than we should not be surprised to
find multiple specialised problem-solving devices within our mind and brain. Still, against classicism, I
claim that any computational account of these devices, and language seems to be one of them, needs to
thoroughly consider neural-level constraints. On the other hand, in favour of classicism, I would like to
stress out that even if our brain processes imply simple associative mechanisms, we are nevertheless
able to behave in a rule-based way. I can, for instance, follow rules when I cook a certain meal for
instance. Rule-like behaviour need not imply rule-based processes. But genuinely rule-based processes
and behaviour, and I think they exist, need to be explained nevertheless. After all linguists can ÔextractÕ
rules from any language and use them to create new combinations of words or morphemes, even if this
is not the natural process by which we normally do it.
The case of Luxembourgian
Finally, I would like to show that ClahsenÕs model could yield some rather specific and testable
predictions. In section 5.2, Clahsen defines compounding as resulting from the concatenation of lexical
entries, and since regular plurals have no (or need not have any) lexical entries they cannot be included
in this compounding process. It follows that if we can find a language where regular plurals can enter
the compounding process, at least one of the two basic assumptions is refuted. Either compounding
does not act on lexical entries - and this would mean that ClahsenÕs results on word formation
constraints would have to be reviewed -, or regular plurals do have lexical entries - rendering the
distinction between processing of regular and irregular inflections at least superfluous. In the following,
I report on an informal analysis of plural formation in Luxembourgian, which I performed together
with Anne Schiltz. Of course, this informal linguistic analysis would have to be confirmed as well by
formal linguistic analyses as experimental evidence. Still, in terms of the general logic, it clearly
follows ClahsenÕs argumentation. Indeed, first of all, we determined the default plural ending for
Luxembourgian, just as Clahsen did for German. We observed that the plurals of nonsense words were
formed by affixation of -en (e.g., Ôeen galupÕ - Ôzwee galup-enÕ). It should be noted here that, due to the
informal nature of our analysis, we do not have any information about the frequency distributions of
the various plural affixes that are possible in Luxembourgian. Still, the default affixation has be reliably
determined, and it applies to proper nouns and the like too (Ôeen OttoÕ - Ôzwee Otto-enÕ). Second, we
formed various compounds, especially looking for what happens with -en plurals (remember that this
corresponds to the German default -s plurals), and found large amounts of exemplars with -en plurals
as non-head parts of compounds. This precisely is the critical test of ClahsenÕs hypothesis on word
formation constraints. Take, for instance, the Luxembourgian word for cat, Ôeng KaatzÕ. Its plural is
ÔKaatz-enÕ and it can enter, as a non-head, many compounds, like for instance the homologue of Ôcat-
eyesÕ, Kaatz-en-aan. And this holds for many other nouns whose plural is regularly formed. It even
holds for nonsense words, which can enter the compounding processes in their affixation-based
(regular) plural form: 'een galup' - 'zwee galup-en' leads to a possible compound, 'een galup-en-aascht'
('a galup-branch'). In Luxembourgian we thus find the homologues of compounds that are not legal in
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English, like Ôa *bananas-treeÕ or  Ôa *cats-eyeÕ. This either suggests that regular plurals have lexical
entries, or that compounding does not act on (structured) lexical entries as such. Furthermore, in
Luxembourgian we find some oddities with compounds not encountered in German or English. While
the plural of Ôeen BroÕ (a desk) is naturally formed by the default affixation process to yield Ôzwee
Bro-enÕ, we do not hesitate to say Ôeen Bro-s-stuhlÕ (a desk-chair). It thus seems, that even
irregularised plurals, although they are never used as such in Luxembourgian, do enter the
compounding process, and should, according to ClahsenÕs model, have lexical entries. Although the
present findings are very informal, they nevertheless indicate that ClahsenÕs dual-mechanism model of
language processing needs not to be valid across various, closely related, languages and that further
experimental and linguistic research might even favour a lexicon-based, single-mechanism model. This
also reveals a fundamental flaw of general models of cognitive processing based on linguistic
descriptions of specific languages. Indeed they might be good descriptions of the language in question
but neither of the linguistic properties of human language as such, nor of the underlying cognitive
mechanisms.
